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ESTABLISHMENT AND JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRABILITY 
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr.* 
In Establishment and Fairness, Kent Greenawalt provides a 
rich account of the establishment clause, eschewing reliance on a 
single categorical test or overarching value. His method is "to 
develop a sensible, nuanced approach to the religion clauses, one 
that involves a number of debatable choices and does not reduce 
to any simple formula." (p. 433 ). He identifies basic principles of 
nonestablishment and proceeds to analyze specific establishment 
clause problems in light of those principles. The analyses are 
context-specific, value-inclusive, and carefully measured. 
Even under Greenawalt's "totality of the circumstances'' 
approach, however, categorical rules emerge prohibiting gov-
ernment action as establishing religion. As such rules emerge, 
certain government defenses to nonestablishment claims come 
to fail not because they lack merit relative to the nonestablish-
ment values that the categorical rule is meant to serve, but be-
cause they are judicially "unworkable" or "inadministrable." An 
important question thus arises from Greenawalt's analysis of the 
establishment clause and fairness: In a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach to establishment clause claims, are gov-
ernment defenses systematically less judicially workable or ad-
ministrable than establishment clause claims? 
Categorical Rules in a Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test. 
Totality-of-the-circumstances approaches to constitutional prob-
lems are subject to familiar critiques: In the name of "fairness," 
such tests (1) do not adequately serve interests in legal certainty; 
(2) allow too much judicial discretion in ascribing relative 
weights to the values that the analysis comprises; (3) provide 
judges with cover for effectuating values that the analysis does 
not properly comprise- through subconscious bias or conscious 
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subterfuge: and ( 4) require judges to make empirical determina-
tions that judges are not well suited to make. "Categorical" ap-
proaches are subject to the opposite critique: In the name of cer-
tainty, limiting judicial discretion, etc., they preclude account of 
values that, in fairness, a court should consider. Judges and 
scholars have debated whether in given cases courts better fulfill 
their role by accounting for the totality of facts and values a case 
implicates, or by invoking more categorical rules that are certain 
in application and limit judicial discretion. 1 
Even under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, judges 
recognize the need for certainty and workability in some meas-
ure. Thus, categorical rules that preclude consideration of salient 
factors predictably emerge from totality-of-the-circumstances 
inquiries. This dynamic is evident in Greenawalt's analysis. At 
the outset, he identifies certain nonestablishment values that 
bear on problems that arise under the establishment clause. 
These values include protecting religious conscience, promoting 
autonomy, avoiding corruption and intermingling of government 
and religion, promoting equal dignity among citizens, and pre-
serving equality (pp. 6-13). Certain of these values implicate in-
terests of both believers and non-believers, religion and non-
religion, in a given context. For instance, to allow teaching about 
religion in public schools may offend the dignity of non-
believers, but to forbid it may offend the dignity of believers. 
Likewise, to provide government funds to religious schools may 
be unequal treatment relative to religions that lack schools, or 
equal treatment relative to other schools that receive govern-
ment funds. Having identified nonestablishment values, 
Greenawalt develops specific nonestablishment principles (rules, 
if you will) to guide judicial analysis of nonestablishment prob-
lems: "Governments cannot aid particular religions as such or 
promulgate particular religious doctrines .... Governments also 
may not aid religion in general as such or support religious ideas 
that unite a high percentage of religious believers." (p. 15). 
Unworkability and Government Defenses. As Greenawalt 
applies these principles, certain government defenses to estab-
lishment claims prove judicially unworkable (at least anecdo-
tally)-either because they would make a rule more difficult to 
1. See, e.g .. Antonin Scalia. The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175 (1989): Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided. 110 HARV. L. REV. 
4. 42-43 (1996). 
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administer or because they are based on values that themselves 
do not easily translate into a judicially administrable standard. 
First, in Greenawalt's analysis, certain government defenses 
to establishment claims fail because allowing them would make 
it more difficult for judges to administer the rule supporting the 
claim. For example, Greenawalt explores public education and 
religion, including the place of religion in history courses. 
Greenawalt raises a judicial workability concern in this context 
that may lead to overenforcement of nonestablishment values. 
As a general rule, Greenawalt argues, "religion should be ac-
corded its fair place in history courses,'' but "teaching about the 
place of religion in history should not inculcate any particular re-
ligious view" (p. 125). He proceeds to consider whether it vio-
lates nonestablishment for teachers to "identify their own reli-
gious outlooks, encourage free discussion of competing views, 
and argue for their own views" (p. 125). Normally, he argues, it 
would be a forbidden establishment for a Lutheran high school 
teacher to say, "I am going to tell you what I think and why, pre-
senting my position as forcefully as I can; but you should under-
stand that this is not the school's official position and you are 
free to form your own opinions." (p. 129). Students, Greenawalt 
surmises, would not be "in a position to respond critically to the 
teacher's forceful presentation" (p. 129). That said, he observes, 
"such teaching might be appropriate for a small class of superbly 
educated and sophisticated high school seniors" (p. 129). But he 
would not allow such teaching to proceed in this circumstance-
though it would not violate a nonestablishment principle-
because of workability concerns. He explains that "constitutional 
principles need to be administrable by educators and judges. The 
legal inquiry that an exception along these lines would require 
would be too refined and too uncertain in outcome to be practi-
cal .... " (p. 129). Thus, a categorical rule emerges that teachers 
may never identify and defend their own religious views, even if 
in context their conduct undermines no salient nonestablishment 
value. 
In practice, then, as context-specific as Greenawalt's analysis 
is, there comes a "stopping point" at which judges may not con-
sider further refinements of context, though those refinements 
may prove dispositive of the constitutional question. For the sake 
of administrability, courts would hold a government act that in 
fact comported with nonestablishment values to be a violation of 
the establishment clause. In this way. administrability problems 
result in the overenforcement of nonestablishment values. 
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Second, certain government defenses to establishment 
claims fail in Greenawalt's analysis because they are premised 
on values that do not easily translate into judicially workable 
standards. For example, Greenawalt considers whether govern-
ment may provide general grants to all private nonprofit organi-
zations, including religious ones, on a per member basis, as a 
means of fostering good citizenship through civic participation 
(pp. 391-92). Greenawalt argues that courts should hold such a 
program unlawful under the establishment clause insofar as reli-
gious organizations could use the funds for "core religious activi-
ties'' (p. 392). Such use would violate his categorical principle of 
"No Aid to Religious Organizations for Religious Activities" (p. 
53). Any countervailing value, such as the "secular benefit" of 
fostering "good citizenship., would be too '"amorphous" to factor 
in judicial analysis, because "the state cannot measure benefits 
to citizenship of participation in individual churches" (p. 392). 
Greenawalt does not deny the value of good citizenship, but 
relative to a formal principle of "no aid for religious activities," 
he finds it too amorphous to factor in judicial decision-making. 
A Question Worth Considering. It is worth considering, un-
der Greenawalt's analysis. whether government defenses to non-
establishment claims will systematically confront workability 
problems, resulting in overenforcement of nonestablishment 
principles. The answer depends in part on whether Greenawalt 
has defined his nonestablishment principles in such a way that 
legitimate nonestablishment values are more judicially workable 
than legitimate countervailing values. Perhaps by definition, any 
functional establishment clause inquiry will state more clearly 
(and thus workably) principles that limit government action than 
principles that enable government action notwithstanding such 
limiting principles. (For instance, the Supreme Court has pro-
vided greater clarity on whether the First Amendment presump-
tively protects certain forms of speech than on what constitutes a 
"compelling state interest" sufficient to justify a governmental 
limitation on it.") Nonetheless, if governing principles aspire to 
account case by case for all relevant values, the unworkability of 
certain government defenses may call into question the formula-
tion of the governing principles themselves. It also may reflect 
the limits of judicial process in this context. If certain govern-
ment defenses, reflecting real values, are inherently not judicially 
2. See, e.g .. Richard H. Fallon. Jr.. Strict Judicial Scrllliny. 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267. 
1321-25 (2007) (describing how the Supreme Court has not adopted a clear approach to 
identifying compelling governmental interests). 
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administrable, it is worth considering whether the judiciary, rela-
tive to other governmental institutions, is competent in all cases 
to weigh the competing values that the establishment clause im-
plicates. An enduring value of Greenawalt's book is that it 
brings into focus questions such as these-and embraces by its 
very approach their ongoing consideration. 
